Lebanon faces critical test

Lebanese Army Commander General Joseph Aoun has emerged as a frontrunner for the presidency, sparking fierce constitutional discourse over his eligibility.

Central to the debate is his current role as a “first-grade” public servant, which constitutionally mandates a two-year resignation period before assuming the presidency.

However, the 2008 precedent of General Michel Sleiman’s election whilst serving as army commander has established a complex legal framework for interpretation.

Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s historical interpretation maintains that securing upwards of 86 parliamentary votes automatically bestows constitutional legitimacy, as this threshold matches that required for constitutional amendments. This interpretation, however, faces considerable opposition.

Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Gebran Bassil staunchly opposes this approach. “Constitutional amendments necessitate a sitting president, parliament in regular session, a fully empowered government, and initially two-thirds of parliament followed by three-quarters approval”, Bassil stated in his recent public address. He contends that circumventing these requirements would undermine Lebanon’s constitutional framework.

Constitutional expert Dr Said Malek presents a nuanced legal interpretation. “A second-round victory with more than 86 votes would automatically secure the presidency without legal impediment”, he told Asharq Al-Awsat. However, securing between 64 and 86 votes would necessitate review by parliament’s bureau committee, potentially opening a 24-hour window for constitutional challenge by 43 deputies.

The Lebanese Constitution’s Article 49 expressly prohibits first-grade public servants from seeking election during their tenure and within two years following resignation. Military personnel face an additional requirement of a six-month waiting period after leaving service.

Dr Paul Morcos, president of Beirut’s JUSTICIA Foundation, notes parliament’s previous utilisation of Article 74 in 2008 to circumvent Article 49’s restrictions. This precedent treated Sleiman’s case as an “exception to the deadline” owing to the presidential vacuum — a situation that could parallel General Aoun’s current circumstances.

Regarding sectarian voting patterns, Malek emphasises that Lebanon’s constitution does not mandate cross-sectarian voting support. The secret ballot system renders verification of voters’ religious affiliations impossible, making sectarian voting pattern arguments legally moot.

This constitutional debate reflects broader tensions within Lebanon’s complex power-sharing system as the country navigates its presidential selection process amidst competing interpretations of legal precedent and constitutional requirements.